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CONTEXT AND TRIVIA
Samuel Brenner*
BONG HITS 4 JESUS: A PERFECT CONSTITUTIONAL STORM IN
ALASKA'S CAPITAL. By James C. Foster. Fairbanks: University of
Alaska Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 373. $29.95.
INTRODUCTION
con-text,' noun
1. The parts of a discourse that surround a word or passage and can throw
light on its meaning;
2. The interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs: envi-
ronment, setting <the historical context of the war>.
triva,2 noun
1. Unimportant matters: trivial facts or details; also singular in construc-
tion: a quizzing game involving obscure facts.
"My academic mantra," writes Professor James C. Foster3 in the Introduc-
tion to BONG HiTS 4 JESUS: A Perfect Constitutional Storm in Alaska's
Capital, which examines the history and development of the Supreme Court's
decision in Morse v. Frederick,4 "[is] context, context, context" (p. 2). Foster, a
political scientist at Oregon State University, argues that it is necessary to ap-
proach constitutional law "by situating the U.S. Supreme Court's ... doctrinal
work within surrounding historical context, shorn of which doctrine is re-
duced to arid legal rules lacking meaning and significance" (p. 1). He
seeks to do so in BONG HiTS 4 JESUS by incorporating interviews with
and discussion about the parties, some bystanders, and various judges and
* J.D., 2009, University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D. (History), 2009, Brown
University. Associate, Ropes & Gray LLP Law Clerk, Honorable David W. McKeague, Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2009-2010); Law Clerk, Honorable Kim
McLane Wardlaw, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (2010 2011). Along
with Judges Cynthia Holcomb Hall and Andrew Kleinfeld, Judge Wardlaw was on the Ninth
Circuit panel that was overturned by the Supreme Court in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393
(2007). 1 would like to thank Kim Wardlaw, Andrew Arno, Claudia Arno, Charles Brenner,
Elaine Brenner, Anna Faircloth, Dan Laidman, Arie Medley, and Nancy Sims. I would also
like to thank David Levine and the staff of the Michigan Law Review for their able assis-
tance.
1. Context Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/context (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
2. Trivia Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/trivia (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
3. Professor of Political Science, Oregon State University Cascades.
4. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
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lawyers who worked on the case throughout its multiyear history. Among
his subjects are Douglas Mertz, who represented Juneau high school senior
Joseph Frederick from the federal district court in Alaska all the way to the
Supreme Court; David Crosby, Principal Deborah Morse's initial attorney;
former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr, who, as a partner at Kirkland &
Ellis, took up Morse's case after the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled against her; Mary Becker, the former president of the Juneau-Douglas
school board; and retired teacher Clay Good, the former president of the
Juneau Education Association (the teachers' union) who took the famous
picture showing Frederick and other students hoisting the "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS" banner. Foster also traces the litigation from the moment in January
of 2002 when the students in Juneau held up their cryptic sign through the
district court proceedings, the decision by the Ninth Circuit, the reversal by
the Supreme Court, and ultimately the settlement in November of 2008 after
a second round of oral arguments at the Ninth Circuit. Explicitly striving to
emulate a veritable pantheon of academic role models, including, among
others, the sociologist Alan F. Westin, legal scholars Michael Dorf and Peter
Irons, historian Richard Polenberg, and, "[his] muse" (p. 3), the famed an-
thropologist Clifford Geertz, Foster consciously draws upon what he refers
to as "a rich variety of legal, political science, anthropological, and literary
materials" (p. 3). His goal, he explains, is "to make sense of the origins and
consequences of the perfect constitutional storm that engulfed Joseph Fred-
erick, Deborah Morse, and the other 'natives' whose stories shape this
book" (p. 3).
In exploring the context, both doctrinal and sociological or anthropolog-
ical, in which the Morse litigation was decided, Foster has written a book
that is often fascinating, entertaining, erudite, and useful, and that touches
on important and continuing questions of law, freedom of speech, student
rights, and state power. Particularly interesting is the way in which Foster
tracks the litigation, through both briefs and oral argument, through all the
levels of judicial analysis. That said, however, in seeking to employ his
"rich variety" of materials in telling the Morse story, Foster, who is clear-
ly extremely well versed in both high and popular culture, has written a
book that is also often-sometimes maddeningly-frustrating, obscure, or
irrelevant. More problematically, while he devotes space to comparing
Frederick to Till Eulenspiegel, the fourteenth-century German "merry
prankster" who "became legendary in sixteenth-century German Schwank-
literatur, or 'fool's literature'" (p. 18), and invoking the film Heathers,5 in
which characters played by Winona Ryder and Christian Slater systemati-
cally murder popular students, to describe "vexatious high school social
relations" (p. 232 n.42), Foster occasionally omits more useful context or
includes legal or historical analysis that is mistaken or even misleading. Un-
fortunately, Chapter One, in which he sets the scene by recounting
Frederick's and Morse's different views of the events of January 24, 2002,
but also spends many pages quoting at length the views of film critics about
5. HEATHERS (Cinemarque Entertainment 1989).
Brenner Final corrected C.doc 3/23/2012 8:21 AM
April 2012] Context and Trivia 1155
Akira Kurosawa's film masterpiece Rashomon to explain why it is so diffi-
cult to say what actually happened, is historically and stylistically
problematic. That said, a substantial core of the book, which includes Fos-
ter's second, third, and fourth chapters on the Supreme Court's decision in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,6 the Court's
gradual move away from recognizing the full constitutional rights of stu-
dents in public schools and conflation of Fourth Amendment and First
Amendment analyses in the school context, and the recent history of the
Supreme Court justices, is excellent. Foster's central analysis of the Morse
litigation itself, which occupies Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, is thorough
and interesting-though, as in the rest of his work, Foster is continually
drawn away from his central points about this case by what he sees as inter-
esting asides into, for example, how amicus briefs have changed since the
late 1700s (pp. 113-19) and whether the Supreme Court in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries issued unanimous rulings (p. 173). Ultimately, this
is a useful and interesting book, albeit one that raises the question of when
one crosses the line between addressing historical context on the one hand
and recounting historical trivia on the other.
Part I of this Review summarizes the factual and procedural background
that led to the Supreme Court's opinion and to the parties ultimately settling
the Alaska state law claims. Part II examines Foster's book in order and in
depth, addressing the progression of the work and presenting Foster's argu-
ment as a whole. Part III takes a slightly more critical view and touches on
more thematic questions, including the effectiveness of Foster's treatment of
Morse and use of Morse to examine more broadly constitutional doctrine in
the public school context, as well as the fine line that must be drawn be-
tween examining context on the one hand and obscuring the relevant facts
with trivia on the other.
I.
As Washington Post columnist Dana Milbank observed in a tongue-in-
cheek column entitled Up in Smoke at the High Court, published the day
after oral argument in Morse v. Frederick, in this instance a high school
prank had literally become a federal case.7 On January 24, 2002, the
Olympic Torch Relay passed through Juneau, Alaska.' The relay was officially
sponsored by Coca-Cola and other private entities.9 To celebrate the event,
which occurred during school hours, the Juneau school district arranged for
6. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker, of course, is the seminal school speech case, in
which the Court held that students retain First Amendment rights inside the "schoolhouse
gate," and that their speech may be suppressed only if authorities reasonably "forecast sub-
stantial disruption of or material interference with school activities."
7. Dana Milbank, Up in Smoke at the High Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2007, at A2;
see also pp. 145 46.
8. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 98.
9. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Morse,
551 U.S. 393; see also p. 231 n.33.
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district schools to send their students to the streets to see the torch go by,
and even bussed students from distant schools to closer points (pp. 16-17,
231 n.33). The relay route passed in front of Juneau-Douglas High
School, where Deborah Morse was the principal and Joseph Frederick
was a senior.'0 Frederick was late to school that day, but after he arrived,
he joined a group of friends across the street from the school."' When the
cameras following the torchbearers came near, "Frederick and his friends
unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase: 'BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.' "12
Morse, who was watching, and who later explained that she thought the
banner was encouraging illegal drug use, immediately crossed the street,
and demanded that the students take the banner down. 3 Frederick refused,
and Morse grabbed the banner, crumpled it up, and (after bringing Freder-
ick to her office) suspended Frederick for ten days.'4 Frederick appealed his
suspension to the school board, but lost on March 19, 2002.15 On April 25,
2002, Frederick filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court in
Alaska, alleging that the Juneau school board and Morse personally had
violated his rights under the First Amendment and Alaska law, and seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive
damages. 16 Morse and the school board responded by filing motions for
summary judgment on the basis that they were protected from Frederick's
claims by qualified immunity. 17
On May 27, 2003, District Judge John W. Sedwick granted the
defendants' motions, concluding that both Morse and the Board were
entitled to qualified immunity.' The doctrine of qualified immunity for
government officials recognizes that, "where an official's duties legitimately
require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public
interest may be better served by action taken 'with independence and without
fear of consequences.'" "9 Accordingly, "government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."2
Under the two-part qualified immunity test laid out by the Supreme Court in




14. Id.; Frederick, 439 F.3d at Ill5.
15. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397-98.
16. Id.
17. Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at * I (D. Alaska
May 29, 2003), rev'd, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Morse, 551 U.S. 393.
18. Id. at *6.
19. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554 (1967)).
20. Id. at 818.
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Saucier v. Katz,2' a court asks first whether, under the facts viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is any violation of a
constitutional right. If there is, the court then asks whether the right was
"clearly established" at the time of the violation. 22 In this case, Judge
Sedwick found that Frederick could not demonstrate that his right to
disseminate a message that Morse reasonably believed pertained to drugs
was "clearly established" at the time of the incident. 3 Frederick appealed.
On March 10, 2006, the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge
Andrew Kleinfeld (an Alaskan who was appointed in 1991 by George H.W.
Bush) and joined by Judges Cynthia Holcomb Hall (a Reagan appointee)
and Kim McLane Wardlaw (a Clinton appointee), vacated Judge Sedwick's
order, and remanded the case to the district court. 4 Contrasting their view to
Judge Sedwick's, the Ninth Circuit panel observed that the district court
"reasoned that Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,15 as opposed to
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,2 6 governed
Frederick's speech. We disagree."27 Concluding that there was no genuine
issue of material fact, the court reviewed the appeal "on the basis that the
banner expressed a positive sentiment about marijuana use, however vague
and nonsensical. ' 28 The question, the court concluded,
comes down to whether a school may, in the absence of concern about
disruption of educational activities, punish and censor non-disruptive,
off-campus speech by students during school-authorized activities because
the speech promotes a social message contrary to the one favored by the
21. 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
22. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200. In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 224 25 (2009),
the Court clarified that courts could address either prong of the Saucier analysis first.
23. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200. While Judge Sedwick appears to have jumped to the
second Saucier prong without addressing the first, before the Supreme Court's decision in
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 224-25, he should have been required by "Saucier's 'rigid order of
battle,' " id. at 234, to first address whether there had been a constitutional violation. His
conclusion that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because "Frederick does
not argue that the defendants' actions were so far-fetched as to make the illegality apparent,"
Frederick, 2003 WL 25274689, at *3, should perhaps be read instead as a finding that the
defendants did not violate Frederick's constitutional rights. In addressing the defendants'
immunity under Alaska law at a later point in the order, Judge Sedwick did conclude that
under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969), and Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677, 685 (1986), Morse's
actions were appropriate. Frederick, 2003 WL 25274689 at *3, *5.
24. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
25. 478 U.S. at 685 (holding that the school district permissibly sanctioned a student
for his "lewd," sexually explicit speech at a school assembly in support of a candidate for
student government).
26. 393 U.S. 503.
27. Frederick, 439 E3d at 1117.
28. Id. at 1117-18.
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school. The answer under controlling, long-existing precedent is plainly
"No.29
In short, the court explained, Morse and the school board had violated
Frederick's First Amendment rights, because, regardless of whether Freder-
ick's speech "conflicted with the school's 'mission' of discouraging drug
use," the school could not "show a reasonable concern about the likelihood
of substantial disruption to its educational mission."3 Now it was Morse's
turn to appeal; to do so, she enlisted the aid of Kenneth Starr and Kirkland
& Ellis (pp. 119-20).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions, of which it ul-
timately addressed only the first: "whether Frederick had a First
Amendment right to wield his banner.'" After an entertaining set of oral
arguments on Monday, March 19, 2007,32 the Supreme Court on June 25,
2007, ruled in favor of Morse, by a vote of 5 to 4, with Chief Justice John
Roberts delivering the opinion of the Court.33 In summarizing the decision,
Roberts wrote:
Our cases make clear that students do not "shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). At
the same time, we have held that "the constitutional rights of students in
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings," Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682
(1986), and that the rights of students "must be 'applied in light of the spe-
cial characteristics of the school environment.'" Hazelwood School Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker, supra, at 506). Con-
sistent with these principles, we hold that schools may take steps to
safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use. We conclude that the school offi-
cials in this case did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating the
pro-drug banner and suspending the student responsible for it."
4
While the outcome was clear, however, as Foster observes (p. 181), the
meaning of the Supreme Court's decision was less so: though Chief Justice
Roberts was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, three
members of this majority were concerned about the scope of that outcome.
Justice Thomas, for example, concurred "because [the decision] erodes
Tinker's hold in the realm of student speech,' 35 but would have gone much
further than did Roberts, because, in his opinion, "[a]s originally under-
29. Id. at 1118.
30. Id. at 1123.
31. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400 (2007). The second question, which the
Court did not need to reach, was whether the law regarding Frederick's rights was clearly
established at the time of the incident. Id.
32. See pp. 145-65.
33. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396.
34. Id. at 396-97.
35. Id. at 422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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stood, the Constitution does not afford students a right to free speech in
public schools." 6 Where Thomas would have gone further, Justice Alito,
who was joined by Justice Kennedy, carefully limited the majority's hold-
ing, noting that he was joining the majority opinion
on the understanding that (a) it goes no further than to hold that a public
school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as
advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction
of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political
or social issue .... 37
Justice Breyer, who concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part,
thought that it was "unwise and unnecessary" to address the First Amend-
ment question at all, because such a decision in this case would be "both
difficult and unusually portentous."3 Instead, he suggested, the Court
should simply find that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 9
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg, dissented, conclud-
ing that "the First Amendment protects student speech if the message itself
neither violates a permissible rule nor expressly advocates conduct that is
illegal and harmful to students," and that the Court was doing "serious vio-
lence to the First Amendment" by suggesting otherwise.40 As Foster ruefully
observes, "In fine, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), is no less am-
biguous than Frederick's banner at the bar of judgment" (p. 187).
Following remand, the Ninth Circuit returned the case to Judge Sedwick
for further proceedings on the Alaska state actions. 4' On October 10, 2007,
Judge Sedwick found that Frederick's claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief under the Alaska Constitution were moot because Frederick had grad-
uated from his school and his disciplinary record had been expunged
(p. 199). Frederick again appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the same panel
42
heard oral arguments on September 9, 2008-"maul[ing]" David Crosby,
the defendants' attorney, in the process (p. 206). While the parties ultimately
settled on November 3, 2008, before the panel issued a decision, it seems
clear that, given the panel's concerns about whether the school district had
or could really eliminate all record of Frederick's punishment, the defend-
ants were faced once again with the prospect of losing before the Ninth
Circuit.
36. Id. at 418 19.
37. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 425 28 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
39. Id. at 425. In making this suggestion, Breyer reiterated his belief, pre-Pearson, that
the Court "should abandon Saucier's order-of-battle rule." Id. at 430.
40. Id. at 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. See Frederick v. Morse, 499 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2007); pp. 198 99.
42. Foster suggests, incorrectly, that it was "somewhat unusual" for the same panel to
hear the case, p. 205. In fact, after the Supreme Court remands to the Ninth Circuit, provided
the Ninth Circuit did not rehear the case en banc, it is standard for the original three-judge
panel to retain jurisdiction.
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II.
A. Three Beginnings
This is a book that begins several times. In the first beginning, a short in-
troduction, Foster lays out his belief in the necessity of context (pp. 1-2),
explains how he became interested in Morse, invokes his academic role
models (pp. 2-3), and describes how what, for him, "had begun as an ac-
count of a weighty novelty ... became a study in how human relationships
can go off the rails," such that, "[p]laying the role of jurisprudential meteor-
ologist, metaphorically speaking, [he] set about endeavoring to understand
and explain the atmospheric genesis of that perfect constitutional storm in
Alaska's capital" (p. 3). In a welcome move, Foster also provides a timeline
of events, starting with the banner incident in January of 2002 and running
through the settlement agreement that Frederick and the Juneau School Dis-
trict reached on November 3, 2008 (pp. 4-6).
In Foster's second beginning, a "Prologue" entitled "A Tale of Three
Wars and Zero Tolerance," Foster invokes the dismay the Queen of England
expressed when she declared 1992, a year in which British royalty had been
plagued by scandal and misfortune, an "annus horribilis," or "terrible year"
(pp. 7-8). "As a preamble to my concerns in the book you are holding,"
Foster writes, "I want to reflect on the salient aspect of the first decade of
the twenty-first century, our own anni horribili eschewing 'instant opinions'
in lieu of bringing to bear judgment leavened by moderation" (p. 8). Con-
cluding that "[s]ince World War II, Americans have lived in a garrison state,
based on a permanent war economy, suffused with martial imagery" (p. 8),
Foster observes that "[w]ar figures appreciably in this book," in that the
events behind Morse v. Frederick were heavily influenced by the Vietnam
War, the War on Drugs, and the war of litigation between Morse and Freder-
ick themselves, a natural consequence of the "tendency to resort to combat,
in the form of litigation" (pp. 8-9). Noting that the period between January
24, 2002, and November 3, 2008, was Frederick's and Morse's "very own
anni horribili [sic]" (p. 9), Foster suggests, not for the last time, that this
book would never have been necessary if the two had simply expressed a
little tolerance, rather than allowing "their interpersonal excesses" to blow
up their "squall into the perfect constitutional storm" (p. 9).
Unfortunately, Foster's third beginning, an important first chapter enti-
tled "Harmonic Convergence in Juneau: (In)famous for Fifteen Minutes," in
which he attempts to set the scene for understanding the dispute between
Morse and Frederick, is far weaker than the rest of the book. Arguing that
Frederick's and Morse's "stories are a lot messier than 'just the facts,' " Fos-
ter assures his readers that he is not concerned with "the raw fact" that
Frederick unfurled the critical banner on January 24, 2002 (p. 11). Instead,
in an attempt to come to grips with what might be thought of as the theoret-
ical, rather than the historical, nature of what happened, Foster spends a
good part of the next thirty pages comparing versions of Frederick's and
Morse's recounting of events to the perspectives of the characters in
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Rashomon,43 the famous film that stands for the simple principle that differ-
ent people perceive the same events differently. Foster here is clearly
troubled by existential and theoretical questions about how to represent the
Truth of Morse's and Frederick's "perfect constitutional storm" (p. 11).
Even describing Morse as "wounded/wary" and Frederick as "brazen/brash"
(p. 26), for example, causes Foster near-existential pain. "Yet," he laments,
"in the very act of writing those descriptors-as I engrave black letters on a
white page-I realize that I am engaging in precisely the sort of reduction-
ism and, worse, reification that I seek to combat with this project" (p. 26).
Existential angst aside, there is a far more troubling problem with
Foster's approach: in his desire to tell the "stories" rather than the "raw
fact[s]," (p. 11), and to present Morse's and Frederick's individual
Rashomon-like perspectives, Foster engages in some creative-and less-
than-obviously acknowledged-cutting and pasting to make sure those
stories sound coherent and comprehensive. In a subsection entitled
"Rashomon in Juneau" (pp. 27-39), further divided with sub-subheadings
such as "Joe Begins His Story" (p. 27) and "Deb Continues Her Story"
(p. 32), Foster presents what he represents as "Joe and Deb recount[ing]
their stories in their own words" (p. 27). Quoting primary sources is, of
course, a laudable and useful historical tool. Here, however, Foster presents
Morse's and Frederick's "own words" in long blocks of connected, offset
text, clearly leading readers to assume that he is quoting from a single con-
temporary or historical source. A careful reader, however, will, upon reading
the endnotes, discover that Foster has constructed these long block quota-
tions from at least two entirely separate sets of documents. Foster is fairly
open-albeit in the endnotes, rather than in the body of the text-about his
constructive use of sources. He explains that "Joe's stories" and "Deb's sto-
ries" are "composite[s] derived primarily" from his interviews of the two in
2009 and from the depositions that Frederick gave in 2002 and Morse gave
in 2003 (pp. 236 n.74, 237 n.87). Quite apart from the fact that this sort of
construction, without notice in the body of the text, is clearly misleading, it
is also historically absurd. Foster's purportedly comprehensive "stories" are
actually constructed from statements made seven years apart, with the first
made as part of a deposition, during ongoing litigation, and the second com-
ing long after the Supreme Court had issued its opinion and after the parties
had actually reached a monetary settlement. The problems with such an ap-
proach are readily apparent; in a book designed to present the "context,
context, context" (p. 2) of a particular constitutional conflict, Foster's choice
is baffling.
Foster's final purpose in the first chapter is to describe Judge Sedwick's
initial order granting summary judgment to the defendants (pp. 37-38). In
doing so, Foster is somewhat dismissive of Sedwick's decision-although
such dismissiveness does not seem to be warranted by a historically rigor-
ous approach to what the "raw fact[s]" (p. 11) actually were. "The supreme
irony of Judge Sedwick's rulings is that he granted summary judgment[],"
43. RASHOMON (Daiei 1950).
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Foster notes (p. 38). Foster clearly suggests that Sedwick based his ruling
on an inappropriate reading of the facts. Characterizing the order as "judi-
cial discounting trumping judicial fact finding" (p. 38), Foster concludes,
incorrectly, that "Judge Sedwick found no authentic factual disagreement
between the plaintiff and the defendant because he regarded the latter's
account as more valid than the former's" (p. 38). To the contrary, there is
no indication that Sedwick found the defendants' account "more valid"
than Frederick's-only that Sedwick found that there was no genuine dis-
pute of material fact, because the facts that Frederick alleged, even if true,
would have made no difference to the legal analysis.44 (Interestingly, Foster
does not criticize the Ninth Circuit, which in overturning Sedwick's order
similarly found that "[t]here is no genuine issue of fact material to the deci-
sion."45) While concluding that Sedwick's "answers rang untrue to some,"
however, Foster is forgiving: "Legal truth," he concludes, "may have the
assuring ring of authority about it. Legal truth also has the aura of contriv-
ance about it" (p. 39). Before describing how "three judges on the Ninth
Circuit [had] their chance at truth telling," however, Foster turns to estab-
lishing the doctrinal context (p. 39).
B. Doctrinal and Historical Framework
In contrast to the overly theoretical and even angst-ridden first chapter,
the next section of Foster's book, comprising Chapters Two ("The Tentative
Tinker Rule"), Three ("From Black Armbands to Colliding Tubas"), and
Four ("A New Century, A Different Court"), is generally an excellent, clear,
and coherent examination of the legal, historical, and even personal context
that influenced the development and outcome of Morse v. Frederick.
In Chapter Two, Foster seeks to "demystify Tinker," the seminal case in
which the Supreme Court held that a school had violated the First Amend-
ment rights of three students by suspending them in December of 1965 for
wearing black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam.46 Reducing Tinker to
Justice Abe Fortas's "resonant sound bite" (p. 41) that "[i]t can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,' 4 Foster argues,
"obscures several circumstances that render Tinker as much an instructive
historical artifact as a resounding protection of student speech" (p. 41).
Tracing the effect in Tinker of two critical school speech cases decided by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 4 Foster argues persuasively that
44. See Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *5 (D.
Alaska May 29, 2003), rev'd, 439 F3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub non. Morse, 551 U.S.
393.
45. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nor. Morse,
551 U.S. 393.
46. P 42; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
47. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
48. See Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966);
Burnside v. Byars, 363 E2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Tinker really represented a tentative embrace of free speech rights for stu-
dents (pp. 45-46), and was very much "a product of its time" (p. 56), and
especially of the "unique political climate" (p. 47) fostered by the Vietnam
conflict. This argument is not novel, but Foster makes it particularly well. In
one admirable turn of phrase that neatly sums up his argument, Foster ob-
serves that "[a]s constitutional poetry, there is more to Tinker than meets the
eye. As constitutional law, there is less" (p. 45).
Foster's third chapter, one of the most ambitious and strongest in the
book, focuses on explaining the context and the controversy over constitu-
tional rights in public schools that informed the Morse decision. Foster
traces how, in five of the critical cases addressing the constitutional rights
of secondary school students between 1985 and 2002,49 the Supreme Court
essentially limited Tinker through "a line of analysis that resolves the tenta-
tive Tinker rule into a picture of deference to authority" (p. 60). In New
Jersey v. TL. 0.,50 the Court, finding that the Fourth Amendment in public
schools "does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches
be based on probable cause," upheld as "reasonable" the search of a stu-
dent's purse for contraband after the student was caught smoking.51 In
Fraser,52 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the seven-justice majority, up-
held the suspension of a student who delivered a nominating speech for
student government that was in fact "an extended double-entendre" (p. 63),
concluding that school officials may still determine what "would undermine
the school's educational missions. '53 In Hazelwood,54 Justice White con-
cluded that a school had not violated the First Amendment rights of students
who wrote for the school paper when the principal censored articles he
deemed inappropriate because "educators do not offend the First Amend-
ment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 15 In Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton,56 Justice Scalia writing for the majority held that a
school district's policy of requiring random drug testing of student athletes
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because the school officials are the
"guardian[s] and tutor[s]" of the children entrusted to their care.57 Seven
years later, in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 v.
49. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhimeier,
484 U.S 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
50. 469 U.S. 325.
51. Id. at 341-42, 346.
52. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675.
53. Id. at 685.
54. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260.
55. Id. at 270-71,273; see pp. 65-68.
56. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
57. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665; see pp. 68-70.
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Earls,5" as Foster observes, "the other Fourth Amendment shoe dropped"
(p. 70), and the Court sanctioned expanding drug testing to any student who
wanted to participate in an extracurricular activity.
59
It is clear that, in Foster's view, these cases represent a severe curtailing
of the judicial aspirations of the Warren Court; as he observes, "[o]ne might
say that this chapter traces the constitutional consequences of the exhaustion
of the liberal spirit" (p. 57). That said, however, Foster is not sure what the-
se cases really mean for student rights. "Whither goest Tinker?" he asks
(p. 73). "The first thing to say is that little definitive can be said" (p. 73).
Ultimately, he concludes, the only thing that is clear is that "Tinker is in
limbo" (p. 73) and "has gone into eclipse" (p. 74). "Nevertheless," he adds,
"Tinker remains only a few votes away from being applied in practice. The
Court that abandoned Tinker can always potentially embrace it" (p. 74;
footnotes omitted).
In his fourth chapter ("A New Century, A Different Court"), which is
focused on changes in the Supreme Court, Foster "explores the thirty-
four-year skirmish (some would say total war)" over political attempts to
remake the Supreme Court (p. 75), and in particular "the story of how
Justice O'Connor's resignation and Chief Justice Rehnquist's death ... gave
President George W. Bush the opportunity to build on previous Republican
appointments to create 'critical mass' around a policy regime opposed to the
Roosevelt Court's economic liberalism and the Warren Court's civil liberties
jurisprudence" (pp. 75-76). This story is one that has been told before,60 but
Foster tells it powerfully and effectively as he tries to further explain the
context behind the Supreme Court's decisions in cases such as Vernonia and
Earls. Ultimately, for Foster, O'Connor's replacement on the Court by
Justice Alito seems regrettable. "What Justice O'Connor's departure signi-
fies, then," he writes,
is that a receptive voice has been silenced. We will never know how she
would have responded to the specific issues raised in Morse v. Freder-
ick.... What we do know is that the Supreme Court to which Deborah
Morse brought her appeal was not the same body that saw Justice
O'Connor dissent in Vernonia and Earls. (p. 90)
Foster's reliance on this statement to end this chapter, and this doctrinal
and historical section, sounds a sour note; of course the Court in 2007 was
not the same Court as in 2002. Given the quality of Foster's analysis in the
chapter to this point, and that he is concerned with how the Court decided
Morse, rather than Vernonia, it seems surprising that in this chapter he does
not engage in any real analysis of how Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
58. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
59. Earls, 536 U.S. at 528.
60. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al. Of course, there is disagreement with Foster's thesis that the
Roberts and Alito appointments radically changed the Court's direction. See, e.g., Lee Ep-
stein et al., The Bush Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why Conservatives Should Continue To
Yearn and Liberals Should Not Fear, 43 TULSA L. REV. 651 (2008).
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Alito-who respectively authored the majority opinion and critical concur-
rence in Morse-have changed the Court's nature.
6'
C. Briefing, Argument, and Decision
In the third major section of Foster's book, comprising Chapters Five
("The Ninth Circuit Weighs In"), Six ("Not-So-Brief Battles, Not Such Odd
Bedfellows,"), Seven (" 'Up in Smoke at the High Court' "), and Eight
("Five Takes on a Single Event"), Foster examines the arguments made,
briefs filed, and decisions published in Morse itself and looks at some of the
attorneys and judges who made those arguments, filed those briefs, and au-
thored those opinions. While Foster examines and describes a great deal of
material that is useful for those seeking to understand the context in which
Morse was decided, he is continually sidetracked in these chapters-more
so than in the previous section-by a desire to discuss "context" that is
largely irrelevant.
In Chapter Five, for example, in which Foster examines Morse's recep-
tion at the Ninth Circuit, Foster begins with a long description of the history
and nature of the Ninth Circuit, beginning with the 1891 bill that created the
federal circuit courts of appeals (p. 92). He then describes the chapters of
David C. Frederick's book about the history of the Ninth Circuit (p. 93), and
examines several of the Ninth Circuit's most famous historical cases (p. 93-
94). After ten pages of this sort of analysis (pp. 91 -101), interspersed with
an extensive discussion (pp. 95-96) of the Ninth Circuit's en bane proce-
dure-which was not used in Morse-Foster seems for the first time to
realize that his discussion of "context" might be going too far. "The reader
may well be asking at this point, why this lengthy discussion about the court
that decided Frederick v. Morse?" (p. 101). In response to the reader's imag-
ined question-"What does this analysis of the Ninth Circuit have to do
with understanding that case?" (p. 101)-Foster offers three answers: first,
this discussion "situates Frederick v. Morse historically"; second, it "pro-
vides a flavor-a feel, if you will-for the [court] ... as well as how that
court is perceived"; third, it "locat[es] the case within ongoing judicial pro-
cess" (p. 101).
Foster's explanation here seems strained. Certainly, the Ninth Circuit
has a culture, and the Circuit together with certain of its judges has a
reputation-probably undeserved6 2 -as a "bastion of liberalism run
61. Obviously, this is a complex question, and one that has yet to be resolved. See,
e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2010, at A l ("[O]nly one recent replacement altered [the Court's] direction, that of Justice Sam-
uel A. Alito Jr. for Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in 2006, pulling the court to the right"); Linda
Greenhouse, A Surprising Snapshot, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (Mar. 23, 2011, 9:54 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/a-surprising- snapshot/ (noting that in one
term, in divided cases, Roberts voted with Breyer and Sotomayor more often than with
Thomas, Scalia, or Alito).
62. See Stephen J. Wermiel, Exploring the Myths About the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIz. L.
REV. 355 (2006). But see Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, A Decade of Reversal: The Ninth Circuit's
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amok. '63 Understanding that culture and those reputations might reveal a
good deal about the context of Morse, especially if it is true, as Akhil Amar
suggested, that "some of the Supreme Court's attitude toward the Ninth Cir-
cuit is personal;"64 how the court decided a notable immigration case in
1905,6 5 however, seems to have very little to do with anything about the
case. More useful than this lengthy discussion about the Ninth Circuit's
roots is Foster's description of Judges Hall, Kleinfeld, and Wardlaw
(p. 102). That said, however, it is surprising that each of these judges merits
only a paragraph, when the Ninth Circuit's 1974 decision in a fishing rights
case is given a page of its own (pp. 99-100). In appreciating the court's de-
cision in Morse, knowing the judicial philosophies and temperaments of
these individuals-as well as knowing, for example, which of them had
school-age children 6-seems far more important. Also more useful than the
discussion of the Circuit's history is Foster's close analysis of the briefs both
parties filed before the court (pp. 102-10). Given the often-overlooked im-
portance of the actual arguments that attorneys make and the highly variable
quality of the attorneys who appear before the federal courts of appeals, it is
hard to exaggerate the importance of this analysis to Foster's project.
In his sixth chapter, Foster takes this sort of close analysis to the next
level by examining the arguments made in the briefs at both the certiorari
and merits stages before the Supreme Court. Beginning, predictably, with a
long digression into the history and nature of amicus briefs (pp. 113-19),
Foster "speculate[s]" that the five justices who ultimately voted in favor of
Morse also voted to grant certiorari (pp. 120-21), and further speculates-
with some support in the extant academic literature (p. 114-15)-that amicus
briefs therefore had an impact.67 Ultimately, Foster concludes carefully,
Record in the Supreme Court Since October Term 2000, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1557 (2010) (in which a well-known and very conservative Ninth Circuit judge criticized the
Circuit's jurisprudence, observing that between 2000 and 2009 "the Ninth Circuit got it
wrong in 81 percent of its cases that the Supreme Court agreed to hear").
63. Wermiel, supra note 62, at 355.
64. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Does the Supreme Court Hate the Ninth
Circuit? A Dialogue on Why That Appeals Court Fares So Poorly, FINDLAW (Apr. 19, 2002),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20020419.html.
65. P. 93 (citing United States v. Ah Sou, 138 F. 775 (9th Cir. 1905)).
66. Judge Kleinfeld, for example, has three children, all of whom (despite being Jew-
ish) were educated at a small Catholic school in Alaska and had graduated from college by
the time the Ninth Circuit addressed Morse. See Interview with Rachel Kleinfeld (Nov. 11,
2010), available at http://rhodesscholars.wordpress.com/2010/1 1/11/rachel-kleinfeld/; see
also Howard Bashman, 20 Questions f.r Circuit Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, How APPEALING (May 5, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://
howappealing.law.com/20q/2003 05 01 20q-appellateblog-archive.html. When Morse
was argued in the Ninth Circuit in 2004, Judge Wardlaw had two children who were not
of college age. See Interview with Kim McLane Wardlaw, Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Nov. 1, 2004), http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com/main/
2004/11/questions-prese.html.
67. P. 121. Foster observes that Morse was supported by briefs filed by various heav-
yweights, including Solicitor General Paul Clement, pp. 131 33, while the briefs filed in
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"[w]e have seen that the not-so-brief battles in which amici on both sides
engaged plausibly influenced the Court's decision to grant cert" (p. 144).
In Chapter Seven, Foster dissects Starr's and Mertz's oral arguments be-
fore the Supreme Court, and considers more generally the nature of
Supreme Court oral advocacy (pp. 150-53). Ultimately, Foster argues, the
primary goal of the attorneys in this case was to convince Justice Kennedy,
"el jefe," who was presumably in control of the Court's swing (p. 169). It is
clear that Foster believes that Starr was by far the most successful in doing
so. Starr, Foster concludes, "remained focused on his task" and performed
in an "impressive" fashion (p. 157). In Foster's view, the same could appar-
ently be said of Deputy Solicitor General Edwin S. Kneedler (pp. 157-58).
In contrast, Foster suggests that "[tirom the outset, it was clear that Doug
Mertz was going to experience rougher sailing" (p. 159). Mertz, Foster
concludes, was "thrown off balance" by the first few questions, and so
"found it difficult to accomplish his primary task" of "conveying to the
justices Frederick's injury narrative" (p. 160). In comparison, Foster ob-
serves, "Starr sounded all the right notes," even in rebuttal (p. 165).
In his eighth chapter, Foster examines the Supreme Court's five-faceted
decision, and concludes that Morse was "incoherent" (p. 192). Foster begins
the chapter by observing that, even before the decision was released, three
veteran Supreme Court reporters-Linda Greenhouse, Lyle Denniston, and
Tony Mauro-expected the Court to come down somewhere between the
extremes of Frederick's and Morse's positions, and perhaps craft a drug ex-
ception to Tinker (pp. 171-72). Continuing with a long discourse on the
history of unanimous Supreme Court opinions (pp. 173-79), Foster ob-
serves that the Morse Court was a "doubly fragmented tribunal. First, the
justices are deeply split .... Second, the justices also are fractious, in-
clined to write separate opinions staking out their own positions" (p. 179).
Given this fractiousness, Foster observes, it is less accurate to describe the
result in Morse as "5-4" (Roberts, Scalia-Thomas-Alito, and Kennedy-
Breyer-Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter) than as "2-1-2/1-3" (Roberts and
Scalia-Thomas-Alito and Kennedy/Breyer-Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter)
(p. 181). That said, he adds in a "coda," "[r]eading judicial results ...
solely in zero-sum terms is highly misleading" (p. 188). Instead, he sug-
gests, it is useful to read each individual opinion as a "judicial performance"
that might "enlarge our understanding of drug use in public schools,
stimulating imaginative approaches to adolescents and drugs while re-
specting student expression" (p. 193). Pursuing this reading of judicial
opinions not as opinions, but rather as cultural and political performances,
Foster ends this chapter, and this section, by posing an open-ended ques-
tion: Does this decision, he asks, "help us burrow into details of our
shared lives, conjuring images and forging connections, thereby enabling
us to grapple with an intractable social problem in ways that honor us and
burnish our cherished values'?" (p. 193).
support of Frederick came from twelve fairly disparate organizations, including Students for
a Sensible Drug Policy and Christian religious organizations such as Liberty Counsel, p. 135.
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D. Can't We All Just Get Along?
Foster's ninth and final chapter ("Lost Opportunities and Failure of Im-
agination") reads simultaneously as a history of the events that followed the
Supreme Court's remand, a lament about the unclear nature of the Morse
decision, and a call for more tolerance and understanding between potential
litigants. "[T]wo matters remain," Foster writes: "First, for the foreseeable
future, we are stuck with the drug speech exception to protected student
speech .... Morse is a messy precedent providing little useful guidance...
as we go about trying to harmonize the tension between First Amendment
rights and school authority" (p. 224). Second, he adds, we are left with the
"more fundamental" challenge of how to convince potential litigants to "im-
agine breaking free from their self-defined rigid roles and seize the
surprising opportunities that might result" (p. 224). What, he asks, if Morse
and Frederick "had managed to empathize with, instead of rubricizing [sic],
each other?" (p. 225). Had the two managed to converse, he concludes al-
most sadly, "my efforts in this book to kindle conversation would have been
unnecessary" (p. 225).
III.
BONG HiTS 4 JESUS is clearly worthy of praise. At the same time,
especially in considering the more thematic questions of how effective the
book is at explaining the context behind Morse and to what extent "context"
is necessary or helpful in understanding judicial decisions, it is useful to
highlight two significant shortcomings: first, the inclusion of too many
irrelevant references and allusions to popular culture and obscure trivia;
and second, the lack of some critical and relevant material or analysis actually
about or touching on the case, including interviews with Frederick's fellow
students and an engagement with the legal academic literature on Morse.
A. Allusion, Citation, and Trivia
As previously suggested, this book is both fascinating and-primarily
because of Foster's long and random expositions on largely irrelevant histor-
ical events or works of high or popular culture-occasionally maddeningly
frustrating for the reader interested in what happened in Morse. The first
chapter more than any other is afflicted by Foster's love of popular trivia
and abstruse literary allusion. Here we see the reference to Heathers68 and
Foster's strained analogy between Frederick and Till Eulenspiegel (p. 18).
Here too we find, for no reason other than to highlight the notion that high
school principals are "targets," a description of a well-known Gary Larson
Far Side cartoon showing a deer with a bull's-eye birthmark on its chest
(p. 24). Foster in an endnote even compares Morse and Frederick to "[the
two central characters in Ludwig Bemelman's classic Caldecott Honor
68. R 232 n.42; see HEATHERS, supra note 5.
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Book Madeline," with Frederick as a metaphorical Madeline, "wander[ing]
off on his own, to 'pooh-pooh' tigers at the zoo" (p. 236 n.72).
Foster's detours into tangent are not restricted to the first chapter: in his
second chapter, Foster expounds on Janus, the Roman god of thresholds, to
explain that Tinker "is Janus-like," in that the majority and the dissent have
different views of the First Amendment (p. 43). In his third chapter, Foster
compares different views of Tinker to "Prokofiev moments" (p. 73)-which,
he explains, is his term for a dramatic pause just as, "[a]t a dramatic moment
in his splendid Peter and the Wolf-just after the wolf has swallowed the
duck-Sergei Prokofiev's narrator pauses to take stock" (p. 252 n.121).
Many of Foster's allusions are only very loosely connected to his subject. In
his chapter examining amicus briefs, for example, perhaps to demonstrate
that amici can act as lobbyists, Foster includes a long quotation from a col-
umn Will Rogers wrote on October 20, 1929 (days before the Wall Street
Crash of 1929), describing the lobbying activities of Joseph R. Grundy, a
Republican who served as president of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers'
Association (p. 116). In another note, to little purpose, Foster observes that
as a child he used to collect bubblegum cards with sayings that were funny
to an eight-year-old-and he proceeds to recount one that he clearly found
particularly amusing (p. 249 n.55).
The problem with the repeated allusions is not only that they obscure
Foster's central point, or only that they might well be unknown to Foster's
readers, but also that they can be misleading. While Foster may have includ-
ed the reference to Heathers as a joke, for example, the movie in fact is not
a good source to describe "vexatious high school social relations" (p. 232
n.42). Regardless of whether most readers can be expected to know about
Till Eulenspiegel, it seems unlikely that the youthful Joseph Frederick,
while resentful of authority, was particularly interested (as was Eulenspie-
gel) in exposing the vices and hypocrisies of those on whom he pulled
pranks, rather than (as he later explained) on getting himself on television or
"piss[ing] people off' (p. 27). These allusions make Foster's work less ac-
cessible, and detract from what is an impressive analysis of the doctrinal
and historical framework that resulted in the Morse opinions.
B. Missing Context
In light of the material that is only tangentially related to Morse, it is
somewhat surprising that there are also some significant gaps in Foster's
evidence and analysis. Some of these gaps result from missing sources. One
early surprise-especially given the ongoing debates about what the banner
was supposed to mean-is that, while Foster interviews both the head of the
teachers' union and the head of the school board, he does not appear to have
interviewed any of the students who were standing with Frederick and who
helped unfurl the banner.
Another surprising absence is that of any interviews with the judges
who were involved with the case. Foster explains that he was advised by a
colleague that judicial ethics would have prevented judges from speaking
Brenner Final corrected C.doc 3/23/2012 8:21 AM
1170 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 110:1153
with him (p. viii)-but, while there are obviously things judges must keep
confidential, there is nothing necessarily inappropriate about speaking with
a judge about a completed case with which he or she was involved. Indeed,
judges-including judges on the Ninth Circuit69 and justices on the Su-
preme Court70-routinely discuss important cases that they helped decide. If
nothing else, the judges might well have been pleased to discuss their own
backgrounds and judicial philosophies.
Of course, as a quick survey of the three judges on the Ninth Circuit
who twice heard the appeal demonstrates, investigation into the various ju-
dicial philosophies of all the judges involved might have rendered the
history of the case more, rather than less, confusing. Judge Hall, for exam-
ple, who in the 1950s became the Ninth Circuit's first full-time female law
clerk, was a tax expert with a reputation as a conservative who "surprise[d]
court-watchers" with her vote in Morse.7 Judge Wardlaw, the first Latina
ever appointed to a federal appeals court, is a graduate of University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles who worked for years as a partner at a major Los
Angeles law firm and as a federal district judge. Although she is often
viewed as a liberal, Judge Wardlaw describes herself as part of a group of
moderates who "try to follow the law to the best of [their] abilit[ies]" and
whom "you can't predict. 72 Judge Kleinfeld, the "strongly conservative
jurist[]''73 with a "libertarian judicial philosophy" 74 who authored the Ninth
69. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs.
"Process," 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313 (1999); Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and
Activism: Lessons from Judge Cardozo, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629 (2010); Emily
Bazelon, The Big Kozinski, LEGAL AFFAIRS, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-
February-2004/featurebazelon-janfeb04.msp (last visited May 18, 2011); CA Federal Judicial
Profiles, BERKELEY LAw ScH., http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ CAFederalJudicial
_Profiles(4).pdf (last visited May 18, 2011) (citing John Roemer, The Alaskan Frontier Is the
Perfect Backdrop for Andrew Jay Kleinfeld's Libertarian Judicial Philosophy, DAILY J.
(L.A.), May 19, 2010 (" 'Usually, I don't like to say I'm right and the Supreme Court is
wrong,' Kleinfeld said. 'But [Morse] is an exception.' ")).
70. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: The Court Needs Another Woman, USA
TODAY.COM (May 5, 2009, 11:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/
2009-05-05-ruthginsburgN.htm (quoting Justice Ginsburg's observations on an oral argu-
ment in which the Court had not yet published an opinion); Justice Scalia on the Record,
CBS NEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/O4/24/60minutes/
main4040290.shtml (quoting Justice Scalia commenting on Bush v. Gore) (transcript of
Justice Scalia on the Record (CBS News television broadcast Apr. 27, 2008)).
71. See Carol J. Williams, Cynthia Holcomb Hall Dies at 82, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2011, at AA6.
72. Amelia Hansen, Profile: Judge Kim Wardlaw, Ms. JD (Mar. 7, 2007, 5:03 PM),
http://ms-jd.org/profile-judge-kim-wardlaw; see also Kim McLane Wardlaw, First Women
Series: Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, Ms. JD (Mar. 11, 2009, 2:37 AM), http:II
ms-jd.org/first-woman-judge-kim-mclane-wardlaw ("How my personal experiences have
influenced my philosophy can be found in my opinions. I can only assure young lawyers that
developing and maintaining a diverse bench is essential if we are to give real meaning to the
words 'equal justice.' ").
73. See, e.g., John Schwartz, 'Liberal' Reputation Precedes Ninth Circuit Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A33 (quoting Dean Erwin Chemerinsky).
74. John Roemer, The Alaskan Frontier Is the Perfect Backdrop for Andrew Jay Klein-
feld's Libertarian Judicial Philosophy, DAILY J. (L.A.), May 19, 2010.
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Circuit's opinion, grew up in the Bronx and attended Harvard Law School,
but chose to accept a clerkship and then remain in what, in his own words,
was the "small frontier town" of Fairbanks, Alaska. 71 (As the disparate
backgrounds of this unanimous panel suggest, while it is always tempting
to view judicial decisions as reflecting the personalities of the judges
involved, it might in some cases be reasonable instead to view the deci-
sion in a case such as Morse as instead simply reflecting the panel's best
reading of Tinker.)
Equally surprising, given the extensive analysis Foster offers of oral ar-
gument before the Supreme Court, and even before the Ninth Circuit after
remand, Foster does not describe the first oral argument before the Ninth
Circuit.76 The lack of any description of that argument is particularly notable
in light of the rough reception that David Crosby, the defendants' attorney,
received, especially from Judges Kleinfeld and Wardlaw. It is also notable in
light of the hypothetical that Judge Kleinfeld suggested-and that Crosby
stumbled in addressing-regarding whether Morse could have punished a
student who passed out copies of Ravin v. State, the opinion in which the
Alaska Supreme Court held that the state could not justify a statute prohibit-
ing "possession of marijuana by an adult for personal consumption in the
home."'
'7
Two other holes in Foster's book seem to result more from conscious
choice than from a lack of access to sources. The first is the lack of
extensive discussion of much of the legal academic literature on Morse, 7 an
omission that stands in sharp contrast to Foster's exhaustive engagement
with the literature on other issues and questions, including the influence of
amicus briefs (pp. 113-19), and the rise of the Supreme Court bar (pp. 145-
49). The second, which is surprising given Foster's in-depth analysis of
Tinker and five of its pre-Morse progeny, and his suggestion that the Court
has been generally moving away from Tinker's protections for the rights of
schoolchildren, is Foster's failure to address Safford Unified School
District No. 1 v. Redding,7 9 a post-Morse case in which the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized a student's constitutional rights in a drug context. In
Safford, then thirteen-year-old Savana Redding sued Kerry Wilson, a male
75. Bashman, supra note 66.
76. The recording of the oral argument is available through the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.
77. 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975). In his opinion, Judge Kleinfeld discussed Ravin
and the Alaska Supreme Court's "libertarian position[s]" in a footnote. Frederick v. Morse,
439 F.3d 1114, 1117 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393
(2007).
78. For example, even where Foster cites numerous other articles by Erwin Chemerin-
sky, p. 330, he does not list the latter's readily available article on Morse. See, e.g., Erwin
Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 17
(2008). This is not to say that he does not cite any articles about the decision. E.g., p. 298
n.68 (citing Joshua Azriel, The Supreme Courts 2007 Decision in Morse v. Frederick: The
Majority Opinion Revealed Sharp Ideological Differences on Student Speech Rights Among
the Courts Five Justice Majority, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 427 (2008)).
79. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
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assistant principal who, suspecting that Redding was providing
prescription-strength ibuprofen (a forbidden drug under school policy) to
other students, had her bra and underpants searched. Sitting en bane, the
Ninth Circuit-in an opinion written by Judge Wardlaw-found that the
principal had violated Redding's constitutional rights, and that the
principal was not entitled to qualified immunity.8 ' The Supreme Court
affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing that the search violated
Redding's Fourth Amendment rights, but concluding that Wilson was
entitled to qualified immunity because the extent of Redding's rights were
not "clearly established" at the time of the search.8 2 In doing so, the Court
clarified that searches in the school context under TL.O. must be supported
by "reasonable suspicion of danger. 8 3 "The meaning of such a search, and
the degradation its subject may reasonably feel," Justice Souter explained,
"place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own
specific suspicions. 84
CONCLUSION
In spite of its shortcomings, BONG HiTS 4 JESUS is a valuable and
entertaining addition to the literature on Morse, the Supreme Court, and
the constitutional rights of students in the public schools. That said, how-
ever, as Foster recognizes (p. 224), even with a greater understanding of
the context behind the constitutional controversy and the decision, it is
hard to say exactly how important Morse as a decision itself really was, or
is. On the one hand, Morse is one of relatively few school speech cases ever
taken up by the Supreme Court, and so intrinsically has value to understand-
ing the Court's constitutional jurisprudence in the public school context; on
the other hand, Morse is "incoherent" (p. 192), and should perhaps best be
viewed as "a messy precedent providing little useful guidance to students,
teachers, and administrators as we go about trying to harmonize the tension
between First Amendment rights and school authority" (p. 224).
Despite the difficulty of evaluating Morse's importance, I ultimately
think that the decision is not quite as incoherent as Foster suggests and in-
stead accurately reflects that a majority of the Court believes that there
should be a drug exception to Tinker. This majority clearly has serious con-
cerns about tying the hands of school officials, but a subset of this majority
(particularly Justice Alito) is also apparently worried about creating prece-
dent that might enable public schools to limit protected expression, and
particularly religious speech. Put another way, as Safford demonstrates, the
Supreme Court is still attempting to balance the rights of school children
80. Saf/ord, 129 S. Ct. at 2637-38.
81. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1,531 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Safford, 129 S. Ct. 2633.
82. Sqfford, 129 S. Ct. at 2637 38.
83. Id. at 2643.
84. Id.
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with the power of school authorities. This does not mean that Morse is inco-
herent, but only that the subject remains contentious and complex.
Given the nature of the facts and the Supreme Court's decision, BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS does not-and probably cannot-do much to clarify Morse's
lasting importance. What it can and does do is provide welcome background
on the case and those affected by the ongoing Morse constitutional contro-
versy, and, especially, emphasize the importance of studying historical
context in understanding doctrinal development. Ultimately, of course, it
also demonstrates that it is possible to take this principle too far, such that
legal historians are focusing not as much on historical context as on histori-
cal trivia.
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